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Volume 4: Issue 1
Cultural Cognition of Patents
Simply making empirical progress is not always enough to influence policy, as 
demonstrated by the polarized public discourse over issues ranging from climate change1 
to gun control.2 The current discourse over patents appears to have a similar pathology, in 
which cultural values—such as respect for strong property rights or concern about limiting 
access to knowledge—shape priors and affect the weight given to new information. Just 
as participants in the gun-control debates often fail to acknowledge the lack of clear 
evidence that right-to-carry laws either decrease or increase violent crime,3 advocates and 
policymakers on both sides of the patent wars often fail to acknowledge the ambiguity of 
evidence on issues such as whether patents promote innovation. In this Essay, I suggest 
that the “cultural cognition” framework might help scholars to understand this value-based 
division and to study ways to design and communicate patent experiments so that the 
resulting knowledge has the impact it should. 
I. The Conflict over Patent Facts
To some, the evidence seems clear that strong patent laws promote innovation and are a 
source of net social utility. In the hearings leading up to the recent America Invents Act, the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. For helpful comments, thanks to Tun-Jen Chiang, Rochelle 
Dreyfuss, Dan Kahan, Mark Lemley, Gregory Mandel, Jonathan Masur, Michael Mattioli, Michael Risch, and 
Maggie Wittlin.
1. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald 
Braman & Gregory Mandel, The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate 
Change Risks, 2 Nature Climate ChaNge 732 (2012).
2. See generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of 
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 u. Pa. l. rev. 1291 (2003).
3. See Charles F. WellFord et al., Nat’l researCh CouNCil oF the Nat’l aCads., Firearms aNd violeNCe: a 
CritiCal revieW 2 (2005) (“[D]espite a large body of research, the committee found no credible evidence that 
the passage of right-to-carry laws decreases or increases violent crime.”); Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & 
Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right-to-Carry Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evalu-
ation of Law and Policy, 13 am. l. eCoN. rev. 565, 616 (2011) (agreeing with the 2005 NRC report that “it is 
not possible to determine that there is a causal link between the passage of right-to-carry laws and crime rates” 
and “underscor[ing] the sensitivity of gun crime estimates to modeling decisions”).
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director of the PTO asserted that “[t]he overwhelming evidence of the history of the U.S. 
patent system suggests that strong IP protection supports, rather than impedes, innovation.”4 
Scott Kieff asserts that “[e]conomic research over the past sixty years has amply established 
a causal link between the development of intellectual property and the growth of our 
national economy.”5 Richard Epstein has ridiculed the notion that patents have slowed the 
software industry down because if “you look at the rate of technological progress [over the 
past five years], it just doesn’t seem in any way shape or form to have been slowed down.”6 
Similar statements have been made by judges,7 members of Congress,8 patent bloggers,9 
patent lawyers,10 and business leaders.11
Yet the evidence seems equally indisputable to those advocating weaker patents. Julie 
Samuels, who holds the Mark Cuban Chair to Eliminate Stupid Patents at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, has written that “we have a consensus in the tech community: The 
patent system has started to impede, rather than incentivize, innovation.”12 A recent Techdirt 
article states: “We’ve pointed out over and over and over again that patents are not a proxy 
for innovation. In fact, there’s little to connect the two at all, except potentially for how 
4. Committee Print Regarding Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 130 (2005) (statement of Jon W. 
Dudas, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Intellectual Prop. and Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office). 
5. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 miNN. l. rev. 697, 
699 n.4 (2001).
6. Patent Rights: A Spark or Hindrance for the Economy?, the Federalist soC’y 8:25 (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/patent-rights-a-spark-or-hindrance-for-the-economy-podcast.
7. See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Rader, 
C.J., dissenting) (stating that the “academic proposition” that patents could “impede more than stimulate tech-
nological advance” has not been verified “in an era of empirical research” because “it does not happen”).
8. See, e.g., Marsha Blackburn, White House Must Strengthen Foundation of US Innovation, the hill (July 
9, 2013), http://thehill.com/special-reports/innovation-a-intellectual-property-july-2013/309999-white-
house-must-strengthen-foundation-of-us-innovation- (asserting that evidence of the economic contribution of 
industries that use IP “prove[s] what should be obvious: Strong [IP] rights are essential to expanding economic 
growth and fostering innovation”).
9. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Responding to Critics: My View on Patents & Innovation, iPWatChdog (Sept. 
30, 2009), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/09/30/responding-to-critics-my-view-on-patents-innovation/
id=6421 (stating that studies showing ambiguous effects of patents “are done by academics with an agenda,” 
and that “history is filled with hard, indisputable evidence that shows the positive effects of a strong patent 
system”).
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey I.D. Lewis & Ryan M. Mott, The Sky Is Not Falling: Navigating the Smartphone Patent 
Thicket, WiPo magaziNe, Feb. 2013, at 7 (stating that “[h]istory . . . does not support th[e] assertion” that in-
novation is blocked by the smartphone patent thicket).
11. See, e.g., Donald J. Rosenberg, Patent System Isn’t Broken, N.y. times, Feb. 21, 2013, at A22 (“[O]ur patent 
system . . . . has been the key to multiple revolutions in technological advancement throughout history.”).
12. Julie Samuels, Patent Trolls Are Draining Our Innovation Economy, PolitiCo (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.
politico.com/story/2013/03/patent-trolls-are-draining-our-innovation-economy-88517.html.
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patents can hinder and hold back the pace of innovation.”13 And a 2013 White House report 
on patent-assertion entities asserts that they “have had a negative impact on innovation and 
economic growth.”14
I have recently reviewed the evidence on whether patents promote innovation and 
concluded that it is more ambiguous,15 and other reviews agree.16 But my goal here is not 
to point out the methodological flaws in particular studies or in any one person’s review of 
the evidence—my point is simply that even people who say they agree that the goal of the 
patent system is promote innovation often disagree on the existing facts. This is not only 
a problem for the broad question of whether patents promote innovation in general, but 
also for more specific questions such as whether patents on human genes,17 software,18 or 
pharmaceuticals19 are welfare enhancing; whether granting patents that were not needed 
13. Mike Masnick, Over 90% of the Most Innovative Products from the Past Few Decades Were NOT Patented, 
teChdirt (May 7, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20130502/10513922919/over-
90-most-innovative-products-past-few-decades-were-not-patented.shtml.
14. PresideNt’s CouNCil oF eCoN. advisers, Nat’l eCoN. CouNCil & oFFiCe oF sCi. & teCh. PoliCy, exeC.  
oFFiCe oF the PresideNt, PateNt assertioN aNd u.s. iNNovatioN 2 (June 2013), available at http://www.white-
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf.
15. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 va. l. rev. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2294774.
16. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of Patents, 4 aNN. rev. 
eCoN. 541, 546-49 (2012) (concluding that “the effectiveness of the patent system in encouraging innovation” 
has “proved difficult to answer empirically, largely because of the absence of real experiments”); Adam B. Jaffe, 
The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation Process, 29 res. Pol’y 531, 531 
(2000) (“[R]obust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in 
patent policy are few.”).
17. Compare Declaration of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Ph.D., Joint Appendix at 695, 704, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology 
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398) (“The marginal social benefits of patenting genes 
clearly do not measure up to the profound costs.”), with Brief for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactur-
ers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 19-24, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2107 (“Patent protection of purified and isolated DNA compositions increases access to genetic diagnostic 
tests because the exclusivity conveyed in a patent grant provides the needed incentive to create the diagnostic 
tests in the first place.”).
18. Compare Timothy B. Lee, New Zealand Just Abolished Software Patents. Here’s Why We Should, Too., 
Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/29/new-zealand-
just-abolished-software-patents-heres-why-we-should-too (citing “evidence that most of the patent system’s 
problems are really problems with software patents”), with David Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for 
Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO, An Examination of Software Patents, Keynote Address at the 
Center for American Progress (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kap-
pos_CAP.jsp (“So to those commenting on the smart-phone patent wars with categorical statements that blame 
the ‘broken’ system on bad software patents, I say—get the facts—they don’t support your position.”).
19. See Cynthia Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 saN diego l. rev. 419 
(2014) (discussing how cognitive biases affect patent policy in the pharmaceutical innovation context).
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for innovation will impede other inventors;20 or whether non-practicing entities (NPEs, or 
“patent trolls”) increase the rewards to innovation.21 
II. Cultural Cognition Theory and Patent Values
This dynamic would not surprise psychologists, who have observed our tendency to 
suppress ambiguity, such as by substituting hard questions (do patents promote innovation?) 
with easy ones (can I think of examples in which patents seemed good or bad?).22 In our 
desire to make sense of a complex world, we (over)confidently create causal narratives that 
provide an illusion of understanding.23 Constructing coherent narratives from a cacophony 
of information is not easy: we engage in unconscious “motivated reasoning” to change the 
weight we assign to new evidence in ways that are cognitively congenial.24 Some motivated 
reasoning is due to confirmation bias: we explain away evidence that does not conform 
with our prior beliefs and incorporate evidence that does.25 But how do these priors form 
in the first place, and why is there persistent division on some complex issues, including 
patents? In part, we weigh evidence using a process Dan Kahan and collaborators at the 
Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School, including myself, have termed “cultural 
cognition”: we form beliefs that cohere with the values of groups we identify with.26 This 
is usually a good thing: it allows the public to identify the relevant experts and accept the 
scientific consensus on a diverse range of topics. But when antagonistic cultural meanings 
become attached to issues such as climate change or gun control, cultural cognition can 
20. See Judge Richard Posner & Professor Richard Epstein, Debate About the Patent System, PatCon 3 at Chica-
go-Kent College of Law 48:50 (Apr. 12, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYLyXJTE2aI 
(Epstein: “If you’re talking about patents of sufficiently low value that you can protect [the invention] without 
incurring the cost [of a patent], the likelihood that they’ll be serious stumbling blocks to somebody else I think 
is going to be relatively small.” Posner: “That simply is not true.” Epstein: “It simply is true.” Posner: “And any-
way, it’s an assertion, right?” Epstein: “Unlike yours, which is a divine revelation!”).
21. Compare James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CorNell l. rev. 387, 
423 (2014) (“Only about 5% [of payments made by patent defendants to NPEs] goes to independent inven-
tors . . . .”), with David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent 
System, 99 CorNell l. rev. 425, 443 (2014) (concluding that Bessen and Meurer’s result is driven by three 
NPEs that “attempted to compete in the marketplace as operating companies before turning to aggressive en-
forcement of their patent portfolios” and thus did not need to pay individual inventors for these “home grown” 
patents); and 496: When Patents Attack... Part Two!, this am. liFe (May 31, 2013), available at http://www.
thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/496/when-patents-attack-part-two (reporting than an independent 
inventor who sold his patents to an NPE received $12 million and royalties on future earnings (“something as 
high as 18 and 1/2 percent”)).
22. See daNiel KahNemaN, thiNKiNg, Fast aNd sloW 79-80, 97, 130 (2011).
23. See id. at 199-202.
24. See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PsyChol. Bull. 480 (1990).
25. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 
rev. geN. PsyChol. 175 (1998).
26. See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 harv. l. rev. 1, 19-26 (2011).
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lead to persistent division on the relevant facts.27 Cultural cognition theory examines 
worldviews along two dimensions that have proven to be effective predictive indicators 
of the latent group-based values that drive motivated reasoning: hierarchy/egalitarianism 
(i.e., relative preference for social orderings in which authority is tied to social rankings) 
and individualism/ communitarianism (i.e., belief that an individual’s wellbeing is the 
responsibility of the individual vs. the collective).28 
There have been no empirical studies (yet!) on the impact of cultural cognition on 
beliefs about intellectual property, although Greg Mandel has presented important results 
on public perceptions of intellectual property.29 But these cultural worldviews may also 
be reasonably predictive of the divergent views on patents. People with a hierarchical, 
individualistic worldview tend to value commerce and industry and be suspicious of 
government regulation. They likely value intellectual property rights as protecting an 
individual’s natural rights and supporting industry, and they will thus find it congenial to 
discount any evidence that supports restrictions on these rights. In contrast, those with an 
egalitarian, communitarian worldview “are morally suspicious of commerce and industry, 
which they see as sources of social disparity and vehicles of noxious self-seeking.”30 They 
likely see intellectual property rights as a source of increasing inequality, and will thus find 
it congenial to believe that intellectual property is not welfare enhancing. 
Of course, these (testable) hypotheses could be wrong, or could change; for example, 
if patents come to be viewed more as a government-sanctioned tax that restricts private 
industry and impedes individual entrepreneurs,31 those with a hierarchical, individualistic 
worldview may be less dismissive of evidentiary claims about the harms of patents.32 Or 
27. See, e.g., Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & Mandel, supra note 1, at 732; Kahan & Bra-
man, supra note 2, at 1291. 
28. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 23. 
29. In a study of the general public (and not patent stakeholders in particular), Mandel found that “having 
lower income, being older, being more educated, and having less experience with intellectual property all cor-
relate with the desire for stronger intellectual property protection,” and that “for certain intellectual property 
rights, conservatives prefer stronger rights to liberals, women prefer stronger rights to men, and minorities 
prefer stronger rights to whites.” Greg Mandel, The Public Psychology of Intellectual Property, 66 Fla. l. rev. 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2240335.
30. Kahan, supra note 26, at 24.
31. Cf. Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 tex. l. rev. 303, 
312 (2013) (describing how patents impose a “shadow” tax on patented goods); Mark A. Lemley, The Regula-
tory Turn in IP, 36 harv. J.l. & PuB. Pol’y 109 (2013) (noting the dual character of IP as both property and 
regulation). 
32. Some conservatives—who are more likely to be hierarchical individualists—have expressed skepticism 
about intellectual property, although conservatives are still more likely to favor stronger intellectual property 
rights. See, e.g., Dave Weigel, What Does a Smart Person Do at CPAC?, slate (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/03/derek_khanna_the_young_republican_lost_his_job_
in_the_house_for_having_the.html (describing how Derek Khanna wrote a memo for the House Republican 
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different value-based measures may prove to be more predictive of views about intellectual 
property.33 My claim is simply that cultural cognition likely contributes to the dysfunctional 
public discourse over patents, and that given the importance of patent law in the world 
economy—and thus the importance of truly evidence-driven patent policy—it is worth 
empirically investigating this dynamic.
III. Making Progress in the Patent Wars
The study of cultural cognition could make at least two contributions to the patent 
debate: it could improve both the communication of new evidence on patents and how 
we generate that evidence. Communication of patent-related evidence seems to suffer 
from similar problems as in the climate change and gun control debates: new evidence 
is trumpeted by those who find it cognitively congenial and dismissed by attacking the 
methodology or the source of the evidence by those who don’t.
The science communication and decision research literature has begun to suggest 
plausible strategies for how to communicate empirical results in ways that reduce culturally 
divisive motivated reasoning, such as framing,34 having communication performed by 
“culturally identifiable” experts,35 presenting information along with a culturally congenial 
meaning,36 or focusing on local, audience-specific effects.37 Studies have also shown that 
individuals are more open-minded when their group identity is affirmed than when they are 
encouraged to be objective and rational.38 But these problems are far from solved, with very 
Study Committee arguing that intellectual property rights “were viewed as pure capitalism, when they should 
be treated as a government monopoly at its worst,” which led to the memo being retracted and Khanna being 
ousted).
33. For an explanation of why cultural worldviews are generally preferable to political orientation measures 
(such as liberal/conservative or Democrat/Republican), see Dan Kahan, Politically Nonpartisan Folks Are Cul-
turally Polarized on Climate Change, Cultural CogNitioN ProJeCt Blog (June 21, 2012), http://www.cultural-
cognition.net/blog/2012/6/21/politically-nonpartisan-folks-are-culturally-polarized-on-cl.html.
34. See Teresa A. Myers, Matthew C. Nisbet, Edward W. Maibach & Anthony A. Leiserowitz, A Public Health 
Frame Arouses Hopeful Emotions About Climate Change, 113 Climate ChaNge 1105, 1106 (2012). 
35. See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, Geoffrey L. Cohen, John Gastil & Paul Slovic, Who Fears the HPV 
Vaccine, Who Doesn’t, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition, 34 laW & 
hum. Behav. 501 (2010).
36. See Dan M. Kahan, Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Tor Tarantola, Carol L. Silva & Donald Braman, Geoengineer-
ing and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment, aNNals am. aCad. Pol. & 
soC. sCi. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1981907.
37. See P. Sol Hart & Eric C. Nisbet, Boomerang Effects in Science Communication: How Motivated Reasoning 
and Identity Cues Amplify Opinion Polarization About Climate Mitigation Policies, 39 Comm. res. 701 (2012); 
see also The Science of Science Communication, Nat’l aCad. oF sCi. (May 21, 2012), http://www.nasonline.
org/programs/sackler-colloquia/completed_colloquia/science-communication.html (conference on empirical 
research on science communication).
38. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lillian Hsu, Michelle McGoey & Lee 
Ross, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility 
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little evidence from outside the lab. And the literature has barely begun to think about how 
to conduct the experiments in ways that reduce cultural division.
In a separate work I have argued that drawing robust conclusions about the causal 
effects of patent laws is difficult due to the focus on uniformity in patent policy, and I have 
called for greater variation through both randomized policy experiments and a governance 
structure known as “experimentalism.”39 But before policymakers invest in costly policy 
experiments, it is important to have confidence that the results of those experiments will 
actually have a policy impact. Thus, in future work with the Cultural Cognition Project, 
I plan to begin to tackle the question of how to communicate results in a way that is 
meaningful to various stakeholders within the patent community. These stakeholders include 
scholars, practitioners (including patent prosecutors and litigators), innovators (including 
both patentees and those who have opted not to patent their inventions), entrepreneurs, or 
ordinary voters who have become interested in patent policy in response to increased high-
profile media attention.40
For example, a recent study showed that subjects’ ability to draw correctly a casual 
inference from (fabricated) data on a politically charged issue—whether a gun ban increased 
or decreased crime—varied based on whether the correct result was consistent with the 
subjects’ ideological predispositions.41 We could conduct a similar study in the patent 
context, with the numbers representing the results from a purported patent experiment, 
such as whether banning patents on software led to increased or decreased R&D spending 
in the software industry. It would be valuable to see whether respondents’ positions on the 
hierarchy/egalitarianism and individualism/ communitarianism axes are in fact predictive of 
their interpretation of the patent experiment results (or whether some alternative measure 
is more predictive). And we could also test whether cultural divergence is lessened through 
different ways of presenting the results. 
In addition to the science communication strategies mentioned above,42 it might help 
to present results in a way that acknowledges (rather than ignores) conflicting prior work 
in Negotiation, 93 J. PersoNality & soC. PsyChol. 415 (2007).
39. Ouellette, supra note 15.
40. In 2012, the Wall Street Journal published 75 articles with “patent” in the headline, the Washington Post 
published 87, and the New York Times published 78 (including a front-page feature, Charles Duhigg & Steve 
Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.y. times, Oct. 7, 2012, at A1). See also 496: When Patents Attack... Part 
Two!, supra note 21. As previously noted, Greg Mandel has begun to study public perceptions of intellectual 
property. See supra note 29.
41. Dan M. Kahan, Ellen Peters, Erica Cantrell Dawson & Paul Slovic, Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened 
Self-Government (Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 116, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2319992.
42. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
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on the subject. For example, a 2013 White House announcement on patent trolls43 mostly 
had general suggestions for improving the patent system that are supported even by some 
trolls,44 but the report’s anti-patent-troll framing and citations to one-sided evidence45 
resulted in negative reaction from pro-patent commentators.46 The report may have gained 
more widespread support if the introductory framing material had been written in a way that 
was more appealing to those with diverse values.
Many of these science communication strategies may allow one to combat either simple 
confirmation bias or the tendency to agree with others with similar pro- or anti-patent views 
without an understanding of why different people form pro- or anti-patent views in the 
first place. But if the cultural cognition framework or other value-based measures turn out 
to be predictive, it opens up a broader range of prescriptions. For example, if hierarchical 
individualists tend to be pro-patent because they value industry and are skeptical of 
governments picking winners, emphasizing that there are non-patent solutions that still 
support industry and do not require the government to pick winners (e.g., R&D tax credits47) 
may make them more open to new data suggesting that patents are not working well in 
some areas. Similarly, if egalitarian communitarians tend to be anti-patent because they 
view patents as increasing inequality, emphasizing ways in which patented technologies 
have benefitted marginalized populations may make them more open to new data suggesting 
that patents do provide a strong incentive for innovation in some areas.
While the science communication literature has focused on how to communicate new 
evidence, it may also be fruitful to examine if who conducts the experiments matters. 
Results may develop a culturally divisive meaning when they are conducted by researchers 
whose past work has exclusively supported one side of the patent debates, or when they are 
funded by organizations with well-known normative commitments. This is not to imply that 
considering a researcher’s motivations is irrational—researchers, after all, are also prone 
to motivated reasoning—but the factual disagreement over patents is exacerbated when 
commentators scrutinize only those studies that they do not find cognitively congenial. 
43. Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-
high-tech-patent-issues; exeC. oFFiCe oF the PresideNt, supra note 14.
44. See “Notorious Patent Troll” Supports 10 out of 12 of the White House’s “Anti-Troll” Measures,  
iPNav (June 6, 2013), http://www.ipnav.com/blog/e2809cnotorious-patent-trolle2809d-supports-10-out-of-
12-of-the-white-housee28099s-e2809canti-trolle2809d-measures.
45. See Joff Wild, The Executive Office of the US President Publishes a Truly Depressing Report on PAEs, iam 
magaziNe (June 4, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=4ee8dfaa-5f6d-48b6-a656-2d41b-
7ba1445 (“In all studies looking at trolls, NPEs and PAEs I apply what I call the ‘Bessen & Meurer test’. If their 
finding that US operating companies incurred $29 billion of direct costs as the result of NPE/PAE activity in 
2011 is reported uncritically I know for a fact that we have a skewed, one-sided piece of work on our hands.”).
46. Gene Quinn, Obama on Patent Trolls – Much Ado About Nothing, iPWatChdog (June 4, 2013), http://www.
ipwatchdog.com/2013/06/04/obama-on-patent-trolls-much-ado-about-nothing/id=41268.
47. See generally Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 31.
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We could conduct similar experiments to evaluate whether cultural division is reduced if 
respondents know that particular results emerged from collaborations between pro- and 
anti-patent researchers, or that there was a public notice-and-comment process before the 
experiment was conducted to allow stakeholders to critique the methodology. Preregistration 
of scientific studies has been hypothesized to improve trust in science,48 and it may be 
effective in the social sciences as well.
Conclusion
The uncertainty in how to conduct experiments and communicate their results such 
that the resulting knowledge has the impact it should is just as real as uncertainty about 
the best patent policies. This Essay has focused on patent policy, and I think the cultural 
cognition framework may be particularly helpful in resolving empirical uncertainty in this 
context. But this uncertainty about designing and communicating the results of empirical 
studies in the social sciences is not limited to patent policy—it is a problem with gathering 
policy-consequential data in any field where that data is imbued with antagonistic cultural 
meanings. And yet we lack a coherent theory of when the group-identity-protective 
mechanisms of cultural cognition will be implicated, or of when policy debates over facts 
will arise through other sources of motivated reasoning. Before the government (or a private 
funder) invests in any costly empirical study, it should have some confidence that the 
outcome will actually settle the factual disagreement. Evidence-based policymaking should 
be evidence-based all the way down, and should thus borrow from and contribute to the 
science communication literature on how to design and communicate experiments in ways 
that respect differing values and promote open-minded consideration.
48. See Chris Chambers et al., Trust in Science Would Be Improved by Study Pre-Registration, the guardiaN 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2013/jun/05/trust-in-science-study-pre-registration.
